conference talks
The Uses of Truth: Is There Room for Reconciliation of Factivist and Non-factivist Accounts of Scientific Understanding? EENPS 2021. June 9-11, 2021, Belgrade. (online)
Is There Non-explanatory Predictive Understanding? 3rd SURe Annual Workshop. April 15-17, 2021, Nijmegen. (online)
Reassessing the Role of Narratives in Psychiatry: The Issue of Conflicting Narratives. ISHPSSB. July 7-12, 2019, Oslo.
Comparing Two Approaches to Assessing Explanatory Power: Inferential Content vs Statistical Relevance. Explanatory Power. June 14-15, 2018, Geneva.
Some Non-trivial Implications of the View that Good Explanations Increase Our Understanding of Explained Phenomena. ECAP9. August 21-26, 2017, Munich.
An Inferential Criterion for Goodness of Explanation. 8th Quadrennial International Fellows Conference. July 11-13, 2016, Lund.
Why Dispositional Explanations Should Not Be Construed as Causal Explanations Even if Such a Construal Is Possible. The Inaugural Conference of the East European Network for Philosophy of Science. June 24-26, 2016, Sofia.
Are Causal Accounts of Explanation Always Useful? In the Case of Personality Trait Explanations They Are Probably Not. 5th Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association. September 23-26, 2015, Dusseldorf
In Virtue of What Do Personality Traits Explain? 15th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. August 3-8, 2015, Helsinki
How Personality Traits Explain. Explanation Beyond Causation. October 23-24, 2014, Munich.
Entitling Explanations. IV Madrid Workshop on New Trends in the Philosophy of Science, November 11-13, 2013, Madrid.
Principles vs. Mechanisms Across the Sciences. 7th Quadrennial International Fellows Conference. June 12-14, 2012, Mugla, Turkey.
Principles vs. Mechanisms in Cognitive Science. 3rd Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association. October 5-8, 2011, Athens.
The Principle Based Explanations are not Extinct in Cognitive Science: The Case of the Basic Level Effects. 14th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. July 19-26, 2011, Nancy.
Thirty Years Cognitive Studies of Categorization: What’s behind the Reported Progress. XXIII International Congress of History of Science and Technology. July 28-August 2, 2009, Budapest.
Models as Inferential Machines. 6th Quadrennial Fellows Conference. July 21-23, 2008, Athens OH, US.
Categorization in Science and in Cognitive Science. 13th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. August 9-15, 2007, Beijing.
A Plea for a Moderate Anti-justificationism. Confirmation, Induction and Science. March 8-10, 2007, London School of Economics, London.
Theory-based vs. Model-based Explanations of Experimental Findings. 31st Annual Philosophy of Science Conference. April 11-15,2005, Dubrovnik.
Image and Logic in Thought Experimentation. Thought Experiments Rethought. September 24-25, 2004, Ghent.
Concepts: False Dilemmas, Neglected Dilemmas. 12th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. August 7-13, 2003, Oviedo.
Piaget and the Categorization Debate in Cognitive Science. 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, August 20-26, 1999, Krakow.
Is There Non-explanatory Predictive Understanding? 3rd SURe Annual Workshop. April 15-17, 2021, Nijmegen. (online)
Reassessing the Role of Narratives in Psychiatry: The Issue of Conflicting Narratives. ISHPSSB. July 7-12, 2019, Oslo.
Comparing Two Approaches to Assessing Explanatory Power: Inferential Content vs Statistical Relevance. Explanatory Power. June 14-15, 2018, Geneva.
Some Non-trivial Implications of the View that Good Explanations Increase Our Understanding of Explained Phenomena. ECAP9. August 21-26, 2017, Munich.
An Inferential Criterion for Goodness of Explanation. 8th Quadrennial International Fellows Conference. July 11-13, 2016, Lund.
Why Dispositional Explanations Should Not Be Construed as Causal Explanations Even if Such a Construal Is Possible. The Inaugural Conference of the East European Network for Philosophy of Science. June 24-26, 2016, Sofia.
Are Causal Accounts of Explanation Always Useful? In the Case of Personality Trait Explanations They Are Probably Not. 5th Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association. September 23-26, 2015, Dusseldorf
In Virtue of What Do Personality Traits Explain? 15th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. August 3-8, 2015, Helsinki
How Personality Traits Explain. Explanation Beyond Causation. October 23-24, 2014, Munich.
Entitling Explanations. IV Madrid Workshop on New Trends in the Philosophy of Science, November 11-13, 2013, Madrid.
Principles vs. Mechanisms Across the Sciences. 7th Quadrennial International Fellows Conference. June 12-14, 2012, Mugla, Turkey.
Principles vs. Mechanisms in Cognitive Science. 3rd Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association. October 5-8, 2011, Athens.
The Principle Based Explanations are not Extinct in Cognitive Science: The Case of the Basic Level Effects. 14th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. July 19-26, 2011, Nancy.
Thirty Years Cognitive Studies of Categorization: What’s behind the Reported Progress. XXIII International Congress of History of Science and Technology. July 28-August 2, 2009, Budapest.
Models as Inferential Machines. 6th Quadrennial Fellows Conference. July 21-23, 2008, Athens OH, US.
Categorization in Science and in Cognitive Science. 13th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. August 9-15, 2007, Beijing.
A Plea for a Moderate Anti-justificationism. Confirmation, Induction and Science. March 8-10, 2007, London School of Economics, London.
Theory-based vs. Model-based Explanations of Experimental Findings. 31st Annual Philosophy of Science Conference. April 11-15,2005, Dubrovnik.
Image and Logic in Thought Experimentation. Thought Experiments Rethought. September 24-25, 2004, Ghent.
Concepts: False Dilemmas, Neglected Dilemmas. 12th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. August 7-13, 2003, Oviedo.
Piaget and the Categorization Debate in Cognitive Science. 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, August 20-26, 1999, Krakow.
talks at seminars, invited talks
"Feigned Narratives Do Not Always Satisfy Needs: The Case of Factitious Disorders"
Philosophy of Cognitive Science Seminar, Polish Academy of Sciences, March 26, 2021 (online).
"Explanation, Understanding, and Inference"
International workshop "Perspectives on Explanation", Prague, Czech Republic, May 19, 2017.
"The Controversy Over Non-causal Explanations in Philosophy of Science and its Relevance to Psychology"
Inaugural meeting of POND: Network of Philosophy of Science around the Mediterranean, the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, September 5, 2016.
"Do We Need a Theory of Concepts and What Should It Account For?"
Seminar for the Epistemology of Cognitive Science, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon, November 21, 2013.
"What Models Do that Theories Can’t"
Seminar of the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, February, 2006.
"Concepts: Where the Critics of the Classical View Went Wrong"
Seminar of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, April, 2002.
"Meaning and Action"
Seminar of the Institute of Philosophy of Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, April, 2001.
"The Categorization Debate in Cognitive Science"
"The Human Free Will in a World of Causes"
International Spring Seminar in Cognitive Science, April 17-22, 2000, Bucharest.
Philosophy of Cognitive Science Seminar, Polish Academy of Sciences, March 26, 2021 (online).
"Explanation, Understanding, and Inference"
International workshop "Perspectives on Explanation", Prague, Czech Republic, May 19, 2017.
"The Controversy Over Non-causal Explanations in Philosophy of Science and its Relevance to Psychology"
Inaugural meeting of POND: Network of Philosophy of Science around the Mediterranean, the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, September 5, 2016.
"Do We Need a Theory of Concepts and What Should It Account For?"
Seminar for the Epistemology of Cognitive Science, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon, November 21, 2013.
"What Models Do that Theories Can’t"
Seminar of the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, February, 2006.
"Concepts: Where the Critics of the Classical View Went Wrong"
Seminar of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, April, 2002.
"Meaning and Action"
Seminar of the Institute of Philosophy of Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, April, 2001.
"The Categorization Debate in Cognitive Science"
"The Human Free Will in a World of Causes"
International Spring Seminar in Cognitive Science, April 17-22, 2000, Bucharest.
